Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Scholarly Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2005

Since When Is Dicta Enough to Trump Fourth Amendment Rights?
The Aftermath of Florida v. J.L.
Melanie D. Wilson
Washington and Lee University School of Law, mwilson@wlu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Fourth Amendment
Commons

Recommended Citation
Melanie D. Wilson, Since When Is Dicta Enough to Trump Fourth Amendment Rights? The Aftermath of
Florida v. J.L., 31 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 211 (2005).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Washington and Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized
administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact christensena@wlu.edu.

*irtrae
Since When is Dicta Enough to Trump
Fourth Amendment Rights?
The Aftermath of Florida v. J.L
MELANIE D. WILSON*

There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history
that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees
and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today. Yet if the individual is no
longer to be sovereign, if the police can pick him up whenever they
do not like the cut of his jib, if they can "seize" and "search" him in
their discretion, we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it
should be made only after a full debate by the people of this country.1
This sentiment was expressed by Justice Douglas in 1968 in his dissenting opinion in Terry v. Ohio,2 a case in which the United States Supreme
Court struggled to decide whether or not a police officer violated the Fourth
Amendment when, without probable cause, he stopped and subsequently
frisked a man the officer suspected of "casing" a store in preparation for a
robbery.3 Justice Douglas declared these ideas long before anthrax scares and

* Melanie D. Wilson is an assistant United States attorney in the Northern District of Georgia. She
serves in the Government Fraud and Public Corruption section of the Criminal Division. She Aas served
as both a civil and a criminal assistant. Prior to her service as an assistant United States attorney, she
worked as an assistant attorney general for the State of Georgia and served as a judicial law clerk for the
Honorable Richard C. Freeman, United States District Court Judge, in the Northern District of Georgia. She
received her J.D., magna cum laude, from the University of Georgia with a B.A. in Journalism. The views
expressed in this article are neither the views of the United States Department of Justice nor the views of
the United States Attorney in the Northern District of Georgia. The views should be attributed solely to the
author.
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2. See Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
3. See id. at 6-7.
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prior to a time when Americans learned to live with a persistent and viable
threat of bio-terrorism. Justice Douglas' classic sentiment, as expressed in
1968, remains true today.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, which is guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment, is an "inestimable right of personal security
[, which] belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the
homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs.".4 "'No right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."' 5
Unfortunately for individual liberty, and the inestimable right to personal
security, the Supreme Court's extraneous language in its otherwise, wellreasoned decision in Florida v. J.L. 6 and the lower federal courts' interpretation of that extraneous language, have jeopardized the Constitutional
right to be free from capricious stops and frivolous frisks, both of which
necessarily intrude on the sanctity of the person and sometimes "inflict great
indignity and arouse strong resentment .

. . ."

When read logically and

narrowly, the J.L. decision holds that an anonymous telephone tip, alone, does
not give law enforcement a sufficient legal basis to stop or frisk a suspect.8
Nevertheless, in dicta, the Court hypothesized about some extreme danger to
the public that might justify a warrantless search based on an anonymous tip,
even without probable cause and absent any showing that the anonymous tip
was reliable. 9 Based on that dicta in J.L., the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals approved a warrantless search of a suspect's home "based largely on
information provided by an anonymous caller" who reported that arguing and
gunshots were emanating from a specific address.10 The Eleventh Circuit
justified the search by construing the report as one of "a serious threat to
human life."'"

4. Id. at 8-9.
5. See id. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,251 (1891)); see also Davis
v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,726-27 (1969) ("Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was

meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions
be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory detentions."').
6. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
7. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17 ("[1It is simply fantastic to urge that such a [frisk] performed in
public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a

'petty indignity.' It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person ..

") (citation omitted). In Terry,

the Court warned that such a frisk is not to be "undertaken lightly." Id.at 17.

8. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
9. See id. at 273-74.
10. See United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2002).
11. Id.
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If federal courts adopt the reasoning from the dicta in J.L., the protections
of the Fourth Amendment will vanish. Permitting law enforcement officers
to conduct a Terry stop or, worse, a search of someone's home based on an
anonymous, but urgent, report of danger or criminal conduct would "convert
the Terry decision from a narrow exception... into one that swallows the12
general rule that searches are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause."
I. THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT AND TERRY STOPS

The Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution prohibits the government from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures.' 3 Usually,
therefore, a search or seizure, whether supported by a warrant, or not, must be
based on "probable cause."14 Despite the general mandate that the government have probable cause for any search it conducts or any seizure it makes,
5
the Supreme Court has recognized that mere "reasonable suspicion"' under
the totality of some circumstances can provide the police with an adequate
someone and to conduct a limited pat-downlegal basis to temporarily 1detain
6
type search of the person.

12. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 340 (1990) (internal quotations and brackets omitted)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
13. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)) ('The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and
seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.").
14. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (noting that "[o]rdinarily, a search-even
one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant-must be based upon 'probable cause' to believe
that a violation of the law has occurred."); see also Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390 (searches conducted without
a warrant are per se unreasonable-subject to "a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.").
15. Reasonable suspicion is considerably less proof than a preponderance of the evidence. See
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1990).
16. See Terry, 392 U.S. 1; see also T.LO., 469 U.S. at 340 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973)) (noting that while a search ordinarily requires "probable cause," the
fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures "be reasonable, and although
'both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a
search,"' under the right circumstances, neither a warrant nor probable cause is required by the Fourth
Amendment); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,145 (1972) (noting that a police officer may, under proper
circumstances, approach a person to investigate possible criminal behavior without probable cause to
arrest); accord Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2465 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 9) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects the 'right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person."') (internal quotation omitted).
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In Terry v. Ohio,17 the Court authorized such a limited stop and search,
which later became known as a "Terry stop."' 8 During a Terry stop, law
enforcement officers temporarily detain someone based on an officer's observation of conduct or receipt of other information that reasonablyleads him to
conclude that a crime is, or has been, committed.' 9 Under the authority of
Terry, an officer may stop a person reasonably suspected of criminal activity,
question him briefly, and frisk him for weapons, as long as the frisk is
necessary to protect the officer or other persons present. 20 Although such a
stop and frisk is legal, an officer must have an objectively reasonable basis for
2
the stop. '
In analyzing what evidence would support a valid Terry stop, in 1990 the
United States Supreme Court, in Alabamav. White,22 concluded that an anonymous telephone tip, coupled with independent police work immediately
following the tip, which corroborated "significant aspects of the informer's
predictions," provides the reasonable suspicion necessary to allow such a
stop. 23 Ten years later, the Supreme Court held, in Floridav. J.L. ,24 that an
anonymous telephone tip, without other corroborating evidence of a crime,
does not give law enforcement reasonable suspicion sufficient to support a

17. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
18. In Terry, the Terry stop or "stop and frisk" was equated with "an on-the-street stop, [to]
interrogate and pat down for weapons ... ." Id. at 12. The validity and legality of a Terry stop is assessed
under a "totality of the circumstances" standard. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)) (in evaluating the legality of a Terry stop,
courts consider "'the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture."').
19. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added); see also U.S. v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1144-45 (11th
Cir. 2004) (interpreting Terry as establishing a two-part inquiry-frst whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception, (that determination turns on whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion that
the defendant had engaged, or was about to engage, in a crime) and second whether the stop went too far
and matured into an arrest without probable cause).
20. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-24. Terry was premised on the fact that there is a difference between
"police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment[]" and police action predicated
on "the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not been, and as a
practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure." See id. at 20. The purpose of the limited
search, or "frisk," is not to discover evidence of a crime but to protect the officer while he investigates.
Adams, 407 U.S. at 146.
21. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; see also Buie, 494 U.S. at 332 (recognizing that a patdown for
weapons is legally authorized "where a reasonably prudent officer" would be justified in believing that a
person possessed a weapon based on specific and articulable facts, not on a mere "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch").
22. 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
23. See id. at 331-32.
24. 529 U.S. 266 (2000). J.L was a unanjmous decision. 529 U.S. at 267. But Justice Kennedy
wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Rehnquist joined. Id.
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legal Terry stop. 25 In short, J.L. established the evidentiary floor for a stopand-frisk.
In J.L., someone anonymously called the Miami-Dade Police and
reported that a young black male at a designated bus stop was carrying a gun.2 6
The caller generally described the young man's physical appearance and said
that the young man was wearing a plaid shirt. 27 The caller did not give her
name or phone number.28 The police did not record the conversation, and they
had no other information about the informant. 29 Thus, "[a]part from the tip,
the officers had no reason to suspect... [the young man at the bus stop] of
illegal conduct."3 ° An unknown time after the police received the tip, officers
went to the bus station and saw three black males "hanging out. '"3
One was wearing a plaid shirt.32 Based on the phone tip, alone, the
officers approached J.L., (the young man in the plaid shirt), frisked him, and
found a gun in his pocket. 33 J.L. was charged in a Florida state court with
carrying a concealed firearm without a license. 34 He moved to suppress the
gun.35 Once the case percolated up through the state court system,36 the
United States Supreme Court held that an anonymous tip, lacking other indicia
of reliability, does not provide the necessary legal basis to support a stop-and-

25. See id.at 270 (emphasis added). In United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, (10th Cir. 2004),
the court aptly explained the flaws in accepting an anonymous tip, alone, as grounds to detain someone.
First, a tipster who refuses to identify himself "may simply be making up the story, perhaps trying to use
the police to harass another citizen." Id. at 1190. Second, generic tips (without specificity) could give
police excessive discretion to stop and search large numbers of citizens. Id. at 1191. Tips without details
could certainly provide police with an excuse to search a large number of young men. Id.
26. J.L, 529 U.S. at 268.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 270.
29. Id. at 268.
30. Id.
31. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 269.
35. Id.
36. The case arose in Florida from state charges. The Florida trial court granted the defendant's
motion to suppress the gun. See J.L, 529 U.S. at 269. The Florida appellate court reversed. Id. The
Supreme Court of Florida "quashed" that decision and held the search invalid under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. The decision of the Florida Supreme Court was upheld by the United States Supreme
Court. Id. at 268.
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frisk designed to uncover a gun. 37 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
trial court should have suppressed the gun.
J.L. announced an evidentiary floor for Terry stops and, thereby, provided certainty for defendants, law enforcement officers and prosecutors.
After J.L., officers knew that an anonymous telephone tip, without more, did
not give them sufficient legal grounds to detain a suspect or to search a person, no matter how brief the search and no matter how limited the pat down.38
J.L. provided bright-line guidance to officers. When officers received an
anonymous, non-emergency, phone tip about guns or drugs, they were obligated to conduct an independent follow-up investigation to corroborate the tip,
before stopping, frisking, or arresting anyone.39 The holding in J.L. was
logical, well-reasoned, and rested soundly within the Court's prior Fourth
Amendment Terry-stop precedent, which had emphasized that Terry stops
cannot rest on "inarticulate hunches," or other speculative notions.'
II. EMERGENCY SITUATIONS AFTER J.L.

Unfortunately for individual liberty, the Court in J.L. did not confine its
comments to the facts before it. In dicta, the Court gratuitously observed that
"extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions,"'" and the
Court expressed the possibility that an anonymous tipster could allege such an

37. Id. at 274. See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,227-28 (1983) (considering the application
of the Fourth Amendment to issuance of a search warrant based on a partially corroborated anonymous tip
and deciding that standing alone, an anonymous, written tip did not provide probable cause for a search
warrant but that with additional corroboration, it might).
38. In evaluating where the line between constitutional and unconstitutional detentions fall, law
enforcement officers should compare Gatesand J.L with Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,327-28 (1990).
White concluded that the stop at issue, which uncovered marijuana, was authorized because it was
supported by reasonable suspicion. White, 496 U.S. at 327; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
146-47 (1972) (recognizing that a legally sustainable stop-and-frisk can be based on a tip from a known
informant whose reputation a law enforcement officer can assess and who can be held accountable for
fabricated information).
39. See generally J.L, 529 U.S. 266. Of course, the Supreme Court's decision in J.L does not
preclude the states from requiring even more evidence for a stop and frisk. See, e.g., State v. Davenport,
603 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that police officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion
to conduct a traffic stop despite an in-person tip that led police to conduct independent investigation leading
officers to find drugs in a suspect's car).
40. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
41. See J.L, 529 U.S. at 272. Interestingly, just recently in another Terry stop case, Hiibel v. Sixth
Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, the Supreme Court found itself distancing itself from its prior dicta by stating
"[w]e do not read these statements as controlling .... [W]e cannot view the dicta in Berkemer [v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984),] or Justice White's concurrence in Terry as answering the question ......
Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459.
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extreme danger "as tojustify a search even without a showing of reliability. 42
Although acknowledging that "[tihe facts of ... [J.L.] d[id] not require [the
Court] to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger[s] alleged
in an anonymous tip might be so great.. . [,],,41 the Court continued: "We do
not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the
indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm
44
before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk."
Despite its musings, the Court rejected the government's argument that
an extraordinary danger exception should apply to cases involving automatic
firearms,4" remarking that "[sluch an exception would enable any person
seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police
search of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely
reporting the target's unlawful carriage of a gun. ' 46 Although the Court in J.L.
correctly decided the case before it, the damage from its dicta was done.47

42. See J.L, 529 U.S. at 273.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 272.
46. Id. The Court also recognized that it would be difficult to restrict an extraordinary danger
exception to guns. J.L, 529 U.S. at 272. "Nor could one securely confine such an exception to allegations
involving firearms." Id. "'[Tihe reasons for creating an exception in one category [of Fourth Amendment
cases] can, relatively easily, be applied to others,' thus allowing the exception to swallow the rule[]." Id.
at 273 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1997)).
47. The Court's steady precedent had already provided a legally appropriate exception to the warrant
requirement for emergency situations and other exigencies. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (recognizing that
both "state and federal cases have [acknowledged] that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers
from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need
of immediate aid []" and noting that "'[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency."') (quoting Wayne v.
United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (1963))). See also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (holding
that a burning building presents an exigency sufficient to render a warrantless entry of a commercial
building reasonable.); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,298 (1967) (recognizing that the exigencies of the
situation involving the pursuit of an armed robber into a home permitted the entry without a warrant);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (noting in the context of an unconstitutional,
warrantless search of a hotel room that "[tihere are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the
need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's
warrant for search may be dispensed with."). But the Court's prior exceptions have all been premised on
an officer entering or searching based on his or her reasonablebelief that an emergency or exigency exists.
The Court's dicta in J.L would permit law enforcement officers to search and/or seize without any reliable
information and without any reasonable basis.
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IL THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT'S RESPONSE TO J.L.
Circuit Decisions Generally-Even aside from the context of emergent
situations, after J.L., as long as an officer conducts a Terry stop on the basis
of some piece of reliable evidence beyond an anonymous phone tip, courts
regularly deny a defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during such
a stop. In short, federal court decisions after J.L. demonstrate that an anonymous tip, plus any other indicator of reliability, will suffice as "reasonable
suspicion" necessary for a legal Terry stop. 8 I call the federal courts' application of the holding in J.L., the "anonymous tip + 1-standard."
A.

Anonymous In-personTips Are ConsideredInherently More Reliable
Than Anonymous Telephone Tips.

The circuit courts have decidedly declared that in-person, anonymous
tips are inherently more reliable than anonymous telephone tips. Thus, the
federal courts have regularly held that anonymous in-person tips are legal
authorization for a Terry stop. In fact, the federal courts have generally presumed the reliability of in-person tips, even when such tips lack any other
indicia of reliability.
In United States v. Heard,4 9 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision denying a defendant's motion to suppress a gun, (which a
police officer found in the defendant's waistband during a stop-and-frisk),
based on an anonymous in-person tip.5 0 The police officer, who worked for
the Atlanta metropolitan rail system5 ' was patrolling an in-town rail station
when a patron reported a fight within the station.52 The officer investigated
the fight and soon observed a woman and man in a heated dispute.53 The
officer approached the two embroiled in the conflict and asked what was
happening.54 The woman claimed that the man owed her fifty dollars; the
man agreed that he owed the money.55
While the officer was still present, the man paid the woman the money
he owed and after the argument was resolved, the officer walked from the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

This holds true in cases involving guns, drugs, and other common contraband.
367 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 1278.
Id. at 1276-77. The system, which operates in Atlanta, Georgia, is commonly called MARTA.
Id.
Id. at 1277.
Heard,367 F.3d at 1277.
Id.
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scene with the woman. 6 As the two walked away, the woman told the officer
that the man was carrying a gun.57 Based on the woman's tip, the officer
turned toward the man, made eye contact with him, and told him to "get his
hands up." 58 The man complied, but, as he did, the woman entered an arriving
MARTA train and left the transit station. The officer did not obtain the
woman's name or any other information from her.5 ' Because the woman fled
the station, the officer thought her tip about the gun might not be reliable. But
for his own safety and for the safety of the other commuters within the
MARTA station, the officer placed the man in handcuffs and frisked him.'
During the frisk, the officer found a .38 Special in the man's waistband. 6'
Citing J.L., the man moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the woman's
anonymous tip was legally insufficient for the frisk, because the tip was
inherently unreliable in light of its anonymity. The Eleventh Circuit rejected
the man's anonymity argument and quickly distinguished the J.L. decision.62
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that unlike the situation in J.L., the officer in
Heard "had an opportunity to judge the reliability of the face-to-face informant . ... ,,61 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit "presumed"' that a face-to-face
anonymous tip is more reliable than an anonymous telephone tip "because the
officers receiving the information have an opportunity to observe the demeanor and perceived credibility of the informant. '65 In other words, in Heard,
there was an anonymous tip about a gun, plus one other factor of reliability
-the ability of the officer to judge the reliability of the anonymous informant
first hand. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit deemed the anonymous tip
sufficiently reliable to support a valid Terry stop.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Heard,367 F.3d at 1277.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1277-78.
62. Id. at 1278.
63. Id. at 1279.
64. In presuming that the face-to-face tip was more reliable than a telephone tip, the court was
favorably impressed by the reasoning of several other circuit courts that had decided similar cases. In this
regard, Heardcited the following: United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000) (distinguishing J.L and finding that an anonymous face-to-face tip is inherently more reliable than an anonymous
telephone tip); United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141, 143-44 (4th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing J.L and
holding that an officer's face-to-face encounter with a neighbor is altogether different from an anonymous
tip); and United States v. Sierra-Hemandez, 581 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that while "there is
no per se rule of reliability[,]" information from a citizen who confronts an officer in-person to advise that
a designated individual is committing a specific crime should be given serious attention and great weight
by an officer).
65. Heard, 367 F.3d at 1279; see also Valentine, 232 F.3d at 354.
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Many other circuits have also ruled that anonymous in-person tips are
sufficiently reliable to authorize a Terry stop. For instance, in United States
v. Valentine,66 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that an anonymous
face-to-face tip validates a stop-and-frisk. 67 The Third Circuit distinguished
the facts of J.L., and emphasized the freshness of an in-person tip. 68 The court
also concluded that a face-to-face tip is inherently more reliable than an
anonymous telephone call.69
Similar to the holdings in Heard and Valentine, in United States v.
Dotson," the Seventh Circuit blessed a Terry stop and evidence found during
that stop, because the anonymous tip was relayed face-to-face.7 1 As in Heard
and Valentine, the Dotson court distinguished J.L. "[T]he outcome of J.L. is
not controlling here, both because the Court itself was not addressing the
reliability of a face-to-face tip, and because there are additional facts in
Dotson's case that contribute to the finding of reasonable suspicion. 72 In
approving the search in question, the Seventh Circuit appeared to place the
greatest weight on the fact that the tip was face-to-face. "[T]he nature of the

66. Valentine, 232 F.3d at 350.
67. Id. In Valentine, two police officers were patrolling a neighborhood known for violent crime,
when a young man flagged them down and told the officers that he had just seen a man with a gun. Id. at
352. The tipster described the man's physical appearance in great detail but refused to give his own name,
claiming that he was afraid of retribution from the man with the gun. Id. at 352. The police investigated
further. While the officers looked for the man with the gun, the tipster disappeared. When the police found
a man matching the description given by the anonymous tipster, the officers ordered the man to walk over
and place his hands on the police car. The man said, "Who me?" and ran toward one of the officers. Id.
at 355. The officers stopped the man and wrestled him to the ground. Valentine, 232 F.3d at 355. As they
did, they heard his gun "ting" against the ground. Id. When the officers frisked the man, they found a gun.
Id. at 353. Relying on the J.L. decision, the district court suppressed the gun. Id. at 352.
68. See id. at 354 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)) (noting the importance of
a witness's "recent report."); see also Adams, 407 U.S. at 146 (emphasizing the importance of an
"immediately verifiable" tip).
69. Valentine, 232 F.3d at 354.
70. No. 03-4352, 2004 WL 1435203, at *2 (7th Cir. June 25, 2004).
71. Id. In Dotson, an Indianapolis police officer was on patrol in a residential neighborhood. Id.
at *1. The officer approached an intersection and noticed several people huddled together and what
appeared to be an altercation. Id. The officer saw a woman attempting to restrain a man (the defendant)
from assaulting another woman. Id. When the officer got out of his patrol car and approached the group,
the group scattered. Dotson, No. 03-4352, 2003 WL 1435203, at *1. After the defendant walked away
from the area of the altercation, the defendant entered a parked car and drove off. Id. One lone bystander
remained behind. Id. That bystander reported that people gathered as a result of a domestic dispute and
said that the man who had just driven off (the defendant) "has a gun." Id. when a second officer arrived
at the scene, the first officer shouted to stop the car driven by the defendant, indicating that the defendant/
driver had been involved in a fight and might be armed. Id. Ultimately, the police stopped the defendant
and found a gun under the driver's seat of the car he was driving. Dotson, No. 03-4352, 2003 WL
1435203, at *1.
72. Id.
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tip that [the officer] received about Dotson differs crucially from the tip
received in J.L.-namely, in how it was delivered."73
The circuit courts' consistent distinction between anonymous calls and
"anonymous" in-person tips is consistent with the language in both J.L.'s
majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. In J.L.,the Court
distinguished cases in which the officers' suspicion of illegal conduct arises
from "observations of their own."' Justice Kennedy also distinguished such
circumstances, noting that "a tip might be anonymous in some sense yet have
certain other features, either supporting reliability or narrowing the likely
class of informants, so that the tip does provide the lawful basis for some
police action."75 Justice Kennedy also said that cases in which "an informant
places his anonymity at risk" were different.76 He gave an example: "An instance where a tip might be considered anonymous but nevertheless sufficiently reliable to justify a proportionate police response may be when an unnamed
person driving a car the police officer later describes stops for a moment and,
face to face, informs the police that criminal activity is occurring."77
Although arguably grounded on dicta, the circuit courts' disparate treatment of the two types of "anonymous" tips is justified from both a legal and
common sense perspective, because an in-person tip is not truly anonymous,
as long as a law enforcement officer has a reasonable likelihood of identifying
the tipster later.78 As the Seventh Circuit noted in addressing whether a faceto-face anonymous tip is sufficient to justify a Terry stop, there are many
reasons to credit a face-to-face tip, when the same information delivered
anonymously by phone might not deserve credibility.79 "First, when a tip is
given in person, an officer can 'size up' the credibility of the tipster by
73. Id. See also United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing the
important difference between an anonymous tip and one received by officers during face-to-face discussions
with an unnamed informant); United States v. Thompson, 234 F.3d 725,729 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that
in-person tip was "inherently more trustworthy" than the tip from the unidentified caller in J.L and noting
that the tip demonstrated the "recency and the proximity of [the tipster's] claimed observation."); United
States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141, 144 (4th Cir. 2000) (denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence, noting that a face-to-face encounter with an anonymous tipster does not pose the same credibility
problems seen in iL).
74. See J.L, 529 U.S. at 270.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See United States v. Jenkins, 313 F.3d 549, 556 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that informant risked

his anonymity by repeatedly meeting with police to give detailed tips); see also United States v. Robertson,
305 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's decision denying motion to suppress evidence found
during Terry stop of public bus during police officer's hot pursuit of two suspects based on a van-driver's

in-person tip, although van-driver did not give his name or other information before telling officers that
suspects just boarded bus).
79. See Dotson, discussed supra notes 70-73.
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observing [his] demeanor and by asking [follow-up] questions."8 ° Second,
during a face-to-face anonymous tip, an officer will typically be able to determine how the tipster would know of the alleged criminal behavior and will be
able to tell if the information is sufficiently fresh.8 ' Third, when a tipster
delivers a tip in-person, the tipster risks that the police officer will be able to
identify him or her, by using a physical description and a physical location to
find the tipster later.82
In sum, after J.L., the federal appellate courts have routinely and consistently distinguished cases involving mere anonymous phone tips and have held
that "anonymous" in-person tips are legally different. In fact, many courts
have presumed that a face-to-face tip provides law enforcement with the
reasonable suspicion they need to temporarily detain a suspect and to pat the
suspect down for weapons.
B. Anonymous Phone Tip, Plus Defendant's Own Conduct or Police's
Additional Investigation, Will Support a Terry Stop.
After J.L., the federal appellate courts have also routinely held that an
anonymous phone tip, coupled with one other factor of corroboration and/or
reliability (not present in J.L.), provides sufficient legal grounds to support an
officer's stop-and-frisk. For instance, in UnitedStates v. Johnson,8 3 the Tenth
Circuit upheld a stop-and-frisk that originated with an anonymous phone call
because "accompanying information relayed to [an officer], which included
the dispatch's priority level and a description of the people and situation,"
were deemed adequately reliable; therefore, the court concluded, the district
court erred in suppressing a .22 caliber pistol found on the defendant during
a pat down."

80. See Dotson, No. 034352, 2004 WL 1435203 at *3; see also Heard, 367 F.3d at 1279-80
(noting that officers have a chance to observe the demeanor and perceived credibility of an in-person
informant).
81. See Dotson, No. 03-4352, 2004 WL 1435103 at *3.
82. See id. The court's reasoning in Dotson is consistent with the concurring opinion in J.L:
"[Tihere are many indicia of reliability respecting anonymous tips that we have yet to explore in our cases."
J.L, 529 U.S. at 1380-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
83. 364 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2004).
84. Id. at 1119. In Johnson, the police received a call from a citizen who reported that a middleaged man was forcing a pre-teen girl to walk down Copper and Pennsylvania Avenues in Albuquerque. Id.
at 1187. The caller reported watching the pair, and he described their actions in detail to the police
dispatcher. Id. The caller also stayed on the line for about eight minutes, until a marked police car
approached the two. Id. Finally, when asked, the caller gave the dispatcher his cell phone number, and he
answered all questions of him "forthrightly." Johnson, 364 F.3d at 1187.
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Likewise, in United States v. Perkins,85 the Fourth Circuit held that an
anonymous call containing details not present in J.L. was sufficient to support
a Terry stop and a subsequent search.86 Based on that reasoning, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, denying the defendant's pre-trial
motion to suppress evidence, which included two guns, a rifle, knives, and
drug paraphernalia.8 7 In Perkins,a woman, who did not give her name, called
police and reported that there were two white males in the front yard of a
particular duplex, pointing and displaying rifles.88 The female caller reported
that the men had arrived in a red car with a silver or white stripe. 89 The police
dispatcher reported the call and its contents to two officers patrolling the
area.9" One of the officers was familiar with the area generally and with the
specific duplex identified by the anonymous caller.9 The officer knew the
area to be a high crime area, used for drug trafficking, and he knew that the
second portion of the duplex was under investigation for drug activity.9 2
"Although the caller did not identify herself," one of the officers thought he
knew the caller's identity, based on the specificity of the report, which
indicated that the caller was close to the scene, and based on the fact that one
particular neighbor had previously called and made reliable reports of illegal
activity at the same address.93
In analyzing whether the tip and the other information known by the
officers permitted the Terry stop at issue, the Fourth Circuit noted that
"[w]here a tip is anonymous, it must be accompanied by some corroborative
elements that establish the tip's reliability."94 In deciding that the tip in
Perkinswas sufficiently corroborated, the court distinguished J.L., emphasizing that in contrast to the "purely anonymous call" in J.L., in Perkins the
officer "did not rely solely upon a call made by an unknown person from an
unknown location."95 The reviewing court was satisfied that the caller had
revealed her general location (and the basis of her tip) by the content of her
tip; therefore, the court resolved that the officer "reasonably assumed" that the

85.
5795).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

363 F.3d 317 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2005) (No. 04See id.
Id. at 319.
Id.
Id.
Perkins, 363 F.3d at 319.
Id. at 319-20.
Id.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 323 (citing J.L., 529 U.S. at 270).
Perkins, 363 F.3d at 324.
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caller was the same tipster who had proved reliable in the past.96 The Fourth
Circuit concluded:
Unlike in J.L., [the officer] suitably corroborated the tip, and it was
accompanied by a number of other relevant factors that indicated the
potential for criminal activity. The tip, whether "anonymous ' 97 or
not, carried sufficient indicia of reliability to form part of [the
officer's] reasonable suspicion. We cannot say under these circum98
stances that he was unjustified in conducting the Terry stop.
Similar to the Fourth and Tenth Circuits that have found certain anonymous telephone tips adequately reliable for a Terry stop, in United States v.
Hernandez,99 the Second Circuit denied a motion to suppress evidence even
though the search was based on an anonymous telephone tip. t°° In deciding
that evidence seized during the stop was not suppressible, the Second Circuit
first agreed that the anonymous 911 call was insufficient under J.L. to warrant
the stop of the car, because the "911 call had not yet been corroborated, and
did not have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify [the officer's] stop of the
car."101 But the Second Circuit did not stop its analysis there. The court next
focused on several of the defendant's actions, including that he exited the car,
left the door open, walked away hastily, looked back at the officer and disclaimed, falsely, that he did not speak English. 02 The defendant then returned
to the officer and started speaking English.' °3 Coupling these facts with the

96. Id.
97. The court debated whether the tip was a "purely anonymous" one. Id. at 323. The court
acknowledged that the tip had some characteristics of an anonymous tip because the lady caller did not give
her name. Id. "On the other hand ... [the officer] reasonably assumed the caller's identity." Id.
98. Perkins, 363 F.3d at 324. See also United States v. Quarles, 330 F.3d 650, 655-57 (4th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 977 (2003) (upholding the district court's decision, which distinguished J.L,
and holding that 911 call in which caller did not give his name but during which he stayed on the fine
fourteen minutes, arranged to meet police after stop, and provided detailed information about the
defendant's current actions and the caller's own circumstances was sufficient to support legal Terry stop).
99. No. 02-1261, 2003 WL 1868759 (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2003) (summary order, not selected for
publication). In Hernandez, a 911 dispatcher received an anonymous telephone call and, in turn, relayed
the call to the police on patrol. Id. at * 8. The caller reported that a Puerto Rican man had a gun at 43 York
Street. Id. Based on information provided from the caller, the operator reported to the patrolling officers
that the suspect/man was riding in a gray, four-door Nissan and that a woman was driving the Nissan, going
south on West Street. Id. An officer spotted a gray, four-door Mazda, heading south on West Street. Id.
A man was driving the Mazda and another man was sitting in the front passenger seat; a woman was in the
back seat. Hernandez,No. 02-1261, 2003 WL 1868759, at *8. The driver stopped the car in front of a convenience store. Id. at *9. The police pulled behind the parked car and turned on its emergency lights. Id.
100. Seeid.at*ll.
101. Id. at *9 (citing JL, 529 U.S. at 270-71).
102. Hernandez, No. 02-1261,2003 WL 1868759, at *9.
103. Id.
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anonymous 911 report, the Second Circuit concluded that "these unusual
actions gave [the officer] reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop of [the
defendant], after [the defendant] had left his car."'" In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit engaged in some legal gymnastics. Because it first
deemed the officer's stop of the car a "seizure" for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, 0 5 the court then offered that the defendant "himself was not
'seized' until he turned around, walked back toward [the officer], and submitted to [the officer's] order to halt."' 6 In short, the court worked hard to
avoid the application of J.L. and in doing so effectively applied an "anonymous tip +I -type" analysis to deny the defendant's suppression motion.
Although these circuit court decisions are unquestionably liberal applications of the bright-line rule drawn in J.L., the decisions do not slip beneath the
constitutional floor set by J.L. Nevertheless, these decisions illustrate the
federal courts' general willingness to stretch to find evidence to support a
constitutional Terry stop in borderline cases.
IV. DETERIORATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S PROTECTIONS

Up to this point, this article has discussed the federal courts' reasonable,
albeit liberal, interpretation of the holding in J.L. Whether or not you applaud
the J.L. decision, the cases discussed above follow logically from its holding.
Sadly, however, the incidental comments in the dicta in J.L. have created a
path for the deterioration of the sacred right of personal freedom secured by
the Fourth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit has already taken, and arguably
expanded, that path so as to jeopardize those invaluable rights.
In deciding whether a 911 call, during which the caller reported arguing
and gunshots at a specified address, provided a constitutional basis for a
subsequent warrantless search of a home, the Eleventh Circuit in UnitedStates
v. Holloway, °7 construed J.L. to mean that when an anonymous telephone
caller reports that there is an on-going emergency requiring immediate action,
the unverified, anonymous "emergency" report, alone, can justify the govern-

104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Id. (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,624-29 (1991)).
107. 290 F.3d 1331 (1lth Cir. 2002). In Holloway, someone called "911" around 10:22 p.m. and
reported "gunshots and arguing" from 3785 Washington Street. Id. at 1332. The police were dispatched
to the reported address. Id. While en route, someone called "911" again and reported that the arguing and
gunshots continued. Id. When police arrived at the 3785 address, a man and woman were sitting on the
porch of a mobile home at the address. Id. The officer immediately detained each of them and a neighbor
who wandered onto the property. Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1332-33. Once the officer secured the people,
he approached the home "to check for victims and weapons" inside. Id. at 1333. When he approached,
he found some shotgun shells and later a shotgun. Id.
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ment to search and seize. 10 8 The Eleventh Circuit declared: "[W]hen an emergency is reported by an anonymous caller, the need for immediate action may
outweigh the need to verify the reliability of the caller."' 0 9 The court concluded that "[i]n light of the nature of the 911 call, a lesser showing of
reliability than demanded in J.L. was appropriate in order to justify the search
of [defendant]'s home."" 0 According to the court in Holloway, "[T]he information given by the caller involved a serious threat to human life.""'
Essentially, because of the extreme nature of the reported threat, the Eleventh
Circuit assumed that the anonymous 911 caller was credible. "Because the
police had no reason to doubt the veracity of the 911 call, particularly in light
of the personal observations of the officers once they arrived
on the scene,
21
their warrantless search for victims was constitutional.'
Although the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the police had no reason
to doubt the 911 caller's veracity, the opposite conclusion was equally truethe police had no reason to credit the 911 caller's version of events. The
caller may have been an estranged boyfriend, a disgruntled employee, a drunk,
or someone committed to "set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police
search.., simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting""' 3 gunshots.
In ruling that a warrantless search of a home was constitutionally sanctioned,
the Holloway court distinguished the facts of J.L. as "not based on an
emergency situation[,]" ' 1 4 relied heavily on the dicta in J.L.," 5 and cited
eighteen cases that pre-dated J.L.,116 and one decided six days after the

108. Id. at 1339. At one point in the Holloway decision, the Eleventh Circuit suggests that its ruling
was based on an exigency necessitating immediate search, "information conveyed by the 911 caller and the
personal observations of the officers." Id. at 1338 (emphasis added). The court later expressly
acknowledged that the warrantless search of the defendant's home was "based largely on information
provided by an anonymous caller." Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1339. Moreover, a fair reading of the decision
demonstrates that the court approved of the officer's decision to search and seize, which was made as soon
as he arrived at the defendant's home and before he had time to personally observe behaviors and
circumstances that might have legally supported such a search. See id. at 1332-33.
109. Id. at 1339 (citing J.L, 529 U.S. at 273-74).
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1339.
113. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
114. Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1338.
115. Id. (citing J.L, 529 U.S. at 273-74).
116. The Holloway decision cites United States v. Cunningham, 133 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Gwinn, 46 F. Supp.2d 479 (S.D. W. Va. 1999); United States v. Guarente, 810 F. Supp.
350 (D. Me. 1993). See Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1339 n.6. Holloway also relies on the following: United
States v. Hughes, 993 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gillenwaters, 890 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.
1989); United States v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1985); Mann v. Cannon, 731 F.2d 54 (1st Cir.
1984); United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1357 (8th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Searle, 974 F. Supp.
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decision in J.L.," i which failed to even acknowledge the J.L decision. Ultimately, the court decided: "As long as the officers reasonably believe an
emergency situation necessitates their warrantless search, whether through
information provided
by a 911 call or otherwise, such actions must be upheld
18
as constitutional."
The first obvious flaw with the holding in Holloway is that it assumes,
without any legal or factual support, that an officer acts "reasonably" in conducting a search based on an anonymous telephone tip in which an emergency
is reported. 1 9 As J.L. tindeniably teaches, while there are "situations in which
an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated,exhibits 'sufficient indicia of
reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to [support an] investigatory
stop[,] '

20
1

standing alone, a "bare report of an unknown, unaccountable"

caller does not provide officers with a reasonable12' basis to stop and frisk

1433 (M.D. Fla. 1997); United States v. Hemdon, 390 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Fla. 1975); United States v.
Hogue, 283 F. Supp. 846 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Johnson v. State, 386 So. 2d 302 (Fla. App. 1980); State v.
Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138 (Iowa 1996); State v. Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1984); State v. Mackins, 266
S.E.2d 694 (N.C.App. 1980); State v. Max, 263 N.W.2d 685 (S.D. 1978). See Holloway at 1336-37.
117. United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2000). The Holloway decision also fails
to acknowledge that Richardson could be construed quite nrrowly so as to offer no support for the result
in Holloway. Richardson involved a 911 call from a man identifying himself as Anthony Carter, who
reported that a 19-year-old African-American man named "Lucky" had raped and murdered a female and
that the victim could be found in the basement of a "drug house." Richardson, 208 F.3d at 627-28. The
caller provided an address and reported that he lived in the same house where the body was located. 208
F.3d at 628. Thus, Richardson did not involve an anonymous 911 call. The same is true with regard to the
Cunningham decision. See Cunningham, 133 F.3d at 1070. The caller in that case was not anonymous.
The caller identified herself as Lachonda Williams and said that she was being held against her will.
Cunningham, 133 F.3d at 1071. As the dissent in United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60, 85-86 (1st Cir.
2004), noted, although several circuit courts have purported to apply an emergency doctrine to uphold a
warrantless search or seizure, in each case the call at issue was more than a bare-bones anonymous call.
In some cases, the caller was not anonymous in any sense. See, e.g., Richardson, 208 F.3d at 628 and
Cunningham, 133 F.3d at 1071. In other cases, the caller's address was verified with caller identification,
see Anthony v. New York, 339 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2003), or the police were able to corroborate an
emergency with their own investigation, see United States v. Jenkins, 329 F.3d 579, 580-81 (7th Cir.
2003).
118. Holloway, 290 F.3d. at 1340.
119. The First Circuit has recognized the "valid concerns about the harm to Fourth Amendment
interests from a generous interpretation of the emergency doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement." See Beaudoin, 362 F.3d at 71. The First
Circuit's concern is well-grounded in the Constitution.
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980) (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721
(1969)) ("The Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be founded upon an objective
justification, governs all seizures of the person, 'including seizures that involve only a brief detention short
of traditional arrest."') (citations omitted).
120. J.L, 529 U.S. at 270.
121. The Supreme Court has described reasonable suspicion as "'a particularized and objective basis'
for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity .. " See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
696 (1981); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273 (2002) (In evaluating reasonable suspicion,
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someone. 122 "To invoke th[e] so-called 'emergency doctrine,' the person
making entry must have had an objectively reasonable belief that an
emergency existed that required immediate entry to render assistance or
prevent harm to persons or property within."'' 23 A fair reading of the holding
in J.L., as opposed to the dicta, shows that an uncorroborated anonymous
report of an emergency does not provide officers with a reasonable basis to
search or seize. J.L. does not hold that an anonymous call about a crisis
makes such a report more credible (or more reasonable to rely upon) than an
uncorroborated, anonymous report of a run-of-the-mill crime. While the fact
that a report of an emergency, which potentially puts life at risk, should factor
into any response a police officer makes and, thereby, impact on the
reasonableness analysis,124 a mere report of an emergency cannot, by itself,
support a constitutionally based Terry stop, let alone a warrantless search of
a home. 25 The fact that a call2 6is labeled a "911" or emergent call is a
distinction without a difference. 1

courts "must look at the totality of the circumstances to see whether the detaining officer has a
particularized and objective basis" for suspecting illegal activity.); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552 (noting
that a seizure is "constitutional only if officers reasonably suspect[] the [person] of wrongdoing.").
Reasonableness is the key ingredient to a constitutional search. See generally Illinois v. McArthur, 531
U.S. 326 (2001) (police acted constitutionally detaining a suspect outside his home for about two hours
warrantless as police had probable cause to believe suspect would destroy contraband if allowed to enter
the home and officers made reasonable efforts to accommodate the suspect).
122. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 (emphasis added).
123. See United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673, 678 (4th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added); see also
Beaudoin, 362 F.3d at 66 ("Generally, under the emergency doctrine, there must be a reasonable basis,
sometimes said to be approximating probable cause, both to believe in the existence of the emergency and
to associate that emergency with the area or place to be searched.").
124. See also Buie, 494 U.S. at 331 (In order to determine what constitutes reasonableness in the
search and seizure context, the Court has "balanced the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against [the] promotion of legitimate governmental interests."). For instance, the fact that New
York had been experiencing the mailing of anthrax-tainted letters in October, 2001, contributed to the
district court's finding in United States v. Ullah, No. 02-CR 899 (JFK), 2003 WL 1396300 (S.D.N.Y.
March 20, 2003), that an officer acted reasonably in detaining a suspect who was dressed in a dirty mall
carrier uniform and was dropping "scores of letters" into public mailboxes. The district court's conclusion
was proper because the officer acted based on "the objectively reasonable belief that there was probable
cause that the defendant was carrying envelopes with anthrax in his mailbag ...." Id. at *5-6.
125. The Court in Terry predicted this issue. "In our view the sounder course is to recognize that the
Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the
scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis
of reasonableness." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.15.
126. See Kerman v. New York, 261 F.3d 229,236 (2d Cir. 2001) (an anonymous 911 call describing
an imminent threat of harm, uncorroborated by other police work, is legally inadequate to authorize a
warrantless entry into an apartment home based upon Fourth Amendment privacy protections).
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V. CONCLUSION

When evaluating the reasonableness of a Terry stop, the first inquiry is
what governmental interest allegedly justifies the official intrusion upon a
private citizen's constitutionally protected interests. 127 The government
interest is then weighed against the invasion which the search entails.' 28 In
balancing these interests,
it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure
or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that
the action taken was appropriate? Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
a result [the Supreme] Court has
substantial than inarticulate hunches,
129
sanction.
to
refused
consistently
The Fourth Amendment "is indispensable to the full enjoyment of personal security, personal liberty and private property."' 130 A Terry stop already
permits a law enforcement officer to stop someone and conduct a limited
personal and invasive search based merely on reasonable suspicion. To rule
that an anonymous, but urgent, 911 call without any other indicia of believability or reliability removes the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion
requirement would be to abolish the protections of the Fourth Amendment
altogether.'31 Under such a standard, "'the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects," only in the discretion of the police."" 3 2 Furthermore, as the Court
recognized in J.L., as it rejected the government's argument in favor of an
exception to the reliability analysis for automatic firearms, "[s]uch an excep-

127. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
128. Id. at 21. See also Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459 ("The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment is determined 'by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate government interests."'). There is no "ready test" for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion the search entails. Buie, 494
U.S. at 332.
129. Terry, at 21-22 (citations omitted).
130. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 n.8 (1948) (citing Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, 304 (1921)).
131. As the dissenter noted in Beaudoin, the emergency exception "does not dispense with the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause requirement" when the issue is one of a warrantless search of a residence.
Beaudoin, 362 F.3d at 79. Likewise, the emergency exception does not dispense with the reasonableness
requirement for a stop and frisk. "Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a
warrant would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers." See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
132. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
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tion would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an
intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by placing
an anonymous call falsely reporting the target's unlawful [conduct].' 33
Applying such an analysis, the more inflammatory and outrageous the 911
report, the more reliable its origin. A false report of an imminent anthrax
distribution or the manufacturing of a biological weapon would automatically
subject an innocent citizen to an intrusive and humiliating search. Such a
result is not only an illogical extension of the Supreme Court's precedent, but
also an unconstitutional infringement on personal liberty. Such searches
cannot be tolerated in a civilized society in which police are expected to be
authorized by law, not above it. "When the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not
by a policeman or Government enforcement agent." '34 Otherwise, our form
of government, "where officers are under the law" '35 would effectively be
abolished. Instead, we would find ourselves in a "police-state where [law
enforcement officers] are the law."' 36 In sum, if the Fourth Amendment is to
afford any privacy protection, the ends of a search must not be allowed to
justify the search itself.

133. J.L, 529 U.S. at 272.
134. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
135. Id. at 17 (in the context of rejecting a warrantless search of a hotel room as violative of the
Fourth Amendment, the Court explained why such a warrantless search could not stand under our system
of government).
136. Id.

